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Abstract
It is argued that the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics, and the
philosophical problem of consciousness, both have their roots in the same set
of misguided Cartesian assumptions. The confusions underlying those assump-
tions are analyzed in detail. It is sometimes suggested that quantum mechan-
ics might explain consciousness. That is not the suggestion here. Rather it
is suggested that an adequate non-Cartesian philosophy would transform our
understanding of both quantum mechanics and consciousness. Consequently,
it would change our ideas as to just what it is that we are trying to explain.
Pauli, in a letter to van Franz (quoted Gieser [1], pp.243–4), wrote
Evidently the progress of science must take such a course that the
concept ‘consciousness’ will be replaced by a more general or better
one.
If one knew that these words were written by a leading 20th scientist, but did
not know that the scientist in question was Pauli, one might think that what is
being advocated here is eliminative materialism, or some such similar position
(refs. [2–7], and references cited therein). Since, however, it is Pauli who is
saying this we know he must be thinking along very different lines. Eliminative
materialists propose to deal with the mind-body problem by eliminating the
mental pole of the duality leaving only the material one. Pauli would reject
that proposal because he was looking, not for a materialistic explanation of
mental phenomena, but rather for a “psychophysical monism” in which mind
and matter are seen as “two aspects of one and the same abstract fact”, itself
neither physical nor psychological (Meier et al [8], pp.87, 159). It is easy to see
why a materialist might want to take an eliminativist attitude to consciousness.
The question addressed in this paper is why someone like Pauli, who is not a
materialist, would take such an attitude.
What follows is not an exercise in Pauli exegesis. I am not here particularly
concerned with Pauli’s reasons for taking that view of consciousness. Rather, I
am going to give my own reasons for thinking that he might have been basically
right.
Before proceeding further, I ought to qualify. The meaning of a word like
“cat”, which can be defined ostensively, is securely anchored. However, the
word “consciousness” cannot be defined ostensively, not even by the person
whose consciousness it is (it is surely not possible to point one’s finger at one’s
own consciousness). Consequently, if one is not careful, there is a danger that
its meaning will float, so that it comes to be used in different ways by different
people, or even by the same person at different times. I believe this actually
happens. The criticisms of this paper are only directed at one of its possible
senses.
As an example of a sense of the word which I feel is unlikely to be rendered
obsolete by future scientific advance, consider the Glasgow Coma Scale [9, 10]
which is widely used to quantify the level of consciousness in cases of brain dam-
age. It is possible, even likely, that the Glasgow Coma Scale will, in time, come
to be replaced by some improved method for quantifying degree of conscious-
ness. It is also likely that scientific advances will lead to a deeper and richer
understanding of the phenomenon itself. However, I doubt that this would
amount to the kind of development Pauli had in mind when he wrote of the
concept of consciousness being “replaced by a more general or better one”.
For want of a better term I will refer to the sense in which the word “con-
sciousness” is used in medicine as its “everyday sense”. It is true that the
medical literature on the subject can be quite technical. However, although
medical science has refined the description of states of consciousness, it has
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done so in a way which remains close to the root meaning. A doctor will un-
derstand the statement “the patient is fully conscious” in almost, if not exactly
the same sense that the patient’s relatives understand it. I take the everyday
sense of the word also to include its use in sentences like “She was conscious of
the clock ticking,” to describe the state of being aware of something.
The critical comments in this essay are directed, not at consciousness in the
everyday sense, but rather at the concept as it is used in, for example, philo-
sophical discussions of the so-called problem of consciousness. I will refer to this
second sense of the word as the Cartesian sense. It is true that nowadays there
are not many full-blooded Cartesian dualists left. Nevertheless, a more or less
attenuated version of the Cartesian soul continues to be prominent in modern
philosophical thinking, and it is this which gives rise to the “problem of con-
sciousness”. I think it is clear from context1 that it was Cartesian consciousness
that Pauli had in mind when he made the statement quoted at the beginning
of this essay.
To see that the everyday and Cartesian senses are different consider the
discussion in Chalmers [11]. Chalmers begins by saying that consciousness is
“intangible” and consequently hard to define (p.3), which I think is already an
indication that what is in question is something different from consciousness
in the everyday sense (consider the likely response of a hospital doctor to the
proposition that the state of being non-comatose is intangible, and hard to de-
fine). He then goes on to propose the characterization “the subjective quality
of experience” (p.4). Now the meaning of this will be clear enough to someone
who has received a certain kind of education. More specifically, it will be clear
to someone who has absorbed the basic ideas of the Cartesian philosophy. But
I believe it would be unintelligible to anyone who has not had the benefit of
such an education (probably the majority of English speakers). What Chalmers
thinks of as the subjective quality of greenness, philosophically unsophisticated
people think of simply as greenness, and it would take a lot of work to persuade
them that they are missing something important. Something that is not taken
for granted by the vast majority of speakers cannot be considered to belong
to the everyday sense of a word. Of course, one might think that the Carte-
sian concept of consciousness can be seen to be logically contained in everyday
assumptions, if one takes the trouble to think the matter through carefully.
However, it is precisely the point of this paper that it is not so contained.
Chalmers, like others, thinks that consciousness is hard to define. Why
should that be? I believe that Searle [12] puts his finger on at least part of the
difficulty when he says
The reason we find it difficult to distinguish between my description
of the objects on the table and and my description of my experience
of the objects is that the features of the objects are precisely the
conditions of satisfaction of my conscious experiences of them. So
the vocabulary I use to describe the table—“There’s a lamp on the
1In particular, it is clear that Pauli had in mind the so-called privacy of Cartesian
consciousness—the property of being undetectable by the outside observer.
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rich and a vase on the left and a small statue in the middle”—is
precisely that which I use to describe my conscious visual experiences
of the table. (p.131)
Which provokes the obvious question: if two things have the same description,
how does one tell them apart? Can one tell them apart? Could it just be that
what Searle seeks to convey by the phrase “the contents of my consciousness
when I look at my table” is identical to what a less sophisticated person would
convey more succinctly, simply by saying “my table”? It seems, however, that
that cannot be precisely right, for Searle argues that consciousness is always
perspectival. Consequently, he thinks that his visual consciousness of his table
only comprises the parts he can directly see. Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the
impression that what Searle means by the phrase “the contents of my conscious-
ness” is, if not identical, at any rate close to what an unsophisticated person
means by the phrase “the things around me”: that the contents of Searle’s con-
sciousness, as Searle conceives them to be, can be pictured as something like a
film set, convincing when seen from the front, unpainted wood when seen from
the back.
This way of thinking is historically important, because it led to idealism. In
an amusing critique of idealist philosophy Stove [13] asks what is the “product-
differentiation”: i.e. “what are they selling, these people who call themselves
objective idealists, that a commonsensematerialist could not consistently buy?”
(p.116). His answer is that there is in fact nothing that a materialist could not
consistently buy. In support of this conclusion he cites Bosanquet (one of the
more prominent 19th century idealists), who said in so many words that “ex-
tremes meet”, and “a consistent materialist and thorough idealist hold positions
which are distinguishable only in name” (ibid, p.115).
These days idealism has gone out of fashion. However, believers in Carte-
sian consciousness are still faced with what is essentially the same problem, of
differentiating the contents of consciousness (as they conceive them to be) from
what commonsense would call the objects around us. It is a difficult problem,
and I think that is one of the reasons it is often said that “consciousness” is
hard to define.
There are two sides to the Cartesian polarity: not only Cartesian conscious-
ness, but also Cartesian matter. I am here using the term “Cartesian matter”
rather loosely, to refer, not only to the concept of matter originally proposed
by Descartes himself, but also to its many descendants. I described the concept
of consciousness as it features in, for example, the book by Chalmers [11] as an
attenuated variant of the Cartesian soul. In the same way I would, for exam-
ple, describe the universal wave function proposed by Everett [14] as a (not so
attenuated) variant of Cartesian matter. It goes without saying that Chalmers’
concept of consciousness differs greatly from Descartes’ concept of the soul.
However, it shares with the latter the crucial feature of being a receptacle for
all the supposedly subjective phenomena which, on a Cartesian view, are ex-
cluded from the physical universe. Similarly, Everett’s concept of the universal
state vector, though obviously very different from Descartes’ concept of matter,
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still shares the crucial feature, that it is supposed to be completely describ-
able in purely objective, mathematical terms, without any contamination by
the observing subject. The point to notice is that these two concepts, Cartesian
consciousness and Cartesian matter, are different aspects of a single conceptual
scheme. They are like the two poles of a bar magnet, impossible to isolate.
Idealists attempt to cut the bar in two, keeping only the subjective side of the
polarity. But, as we saw, when they try to carry that idea through consistently
it turns out that the concept of matter has come back in, through the backdoor,
so to speak. Materialists attempt to perform the same bisection, keeping only
the objective side of the polarity. However, they then face the problem that, no
matter how vigorously they attempt to cast doubt on the notion of qualia (see,
for instance, the papers in section 17 of Lycan [15]), the fact remains that, to a
normally sighted person, green things undeniably do look qualitatively different
from red ones. Consequently, if one looks at a green object, while trying to keep
in mind that the quality of perceived greenness is not really a feature of the
object itself, it is difficult to avoid the thought that the quality of greenness is a
feature that is somehow added by one’s own perceptual apparatus. From there
it is but a small step to the Cartesian concept of consciousness.
I believe we need to break away from this whole misguided way of think-
ing: not simply to deny Cartesian consciousness, nor simply to deny Cartesian
matter, but to deny both. There are many empirical reasons for taking such
a course. Modern neuroscience gives us reasons for being suspicious of Carte-
sian assumptions about consciousness (see refs. [4,5,16,17], and references cited
therein); while quantum mechanics gives us equally good reasons for being sus-
picious of Cartesian assumptions about matter (see any textbook).
The aim of physics, as Descartes conceived it, is to arrive at the one true
picture of things, totally objective, and complete in every detail. Before the year
1900 it might have looked as though we were getting steadily closer to that goal2.
However, quantum mechanics strongly suggests that the goal is unachievable.
In quantum mechanics what you see depends on how you look. Make one
kind of measurement on the electromagnetic field and one will obtain results
consistent with it being a smoothly varying wave; make another, different kind
of measurement and one will obtain results consistent with it being a collection of
discrete particles. Similarly, if one observes an atom using a scanning tunnelling
electron microscope one will see an apparently solid object; if, on the other hand,
one observes it with a γ-ray microscope one will see a collection of point-like
particles separated by empty space. So which of these pictures is the true one?
Quantum mechanics declines to say, just as it declines to say what is going on in
a physical system when no one is looking. In place of the God-like conspectus
of the entire universe, with nothing left out, which Descartes imagined and
which continued to inspire physicists for 250 years after him, quantum mechanics
merely gives us methods for anticipating what will be observed in this or that
particular experimental context. Moreover, the fact, that the outcome depends
2Although there were 19th century physicists, such as Mach [18], who did not agree with
Descartes about the goal of physics.
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on the observer’s decision as to which measurement to make, casts doubt on the
assumption, that physics passively records events that would have happened
anyway, in the absence of experimental intervention. This represents a subtle,
but important departure from the Cartesian ideal of total objectivity.
Since the 1920s there have been numerous attempts to reconcile quantum
mechanics with Cartesian assumptions, as to what the world ought to be like
(for an overview see, for example, Schlosshauer [19]). These attempts have been
successful to the extent that it seems there is nothing to logically exclude the pos-
sibility that, underlying the observations, there is some universal mathematical
mechanism. The difficulty is finding a picture of this kind which is empirically
substantiated. When Einstein embarked on the project, of finding an alternative
to the Copenhagen Interpretation, he doubtless hoped to find a single theory
which, like the general theory of relativity, would be uniquely specified by the
interplay of various empirical and aesthetic considerations. Doubtless he also
hoped for new empirical predictions. Of course, conclusive demonstrations are
not to be had in science. So no one can say for sure that Einstein’s hopes will
not be fulfilled at some time in the future. But it does seem to me that the
effect of eighty years of theoretical work has been to make those hopes look
increasingly forlorn.
My own feeling is that an adequate understanding of quantum mechanics
ultimately depends, not on sophisticated technical developments, but on some
simple conceptual shift—something a little like the perceptual shift which occurs
when one looks at a diagram like the Necker cube, or the duck-rabbit picture
(Wittgenstein [20] p.194e, Kihlstrom [21]). I doubt that quantum mechanics
is intrinsically weird. It only seems weird because we insist on looking at it
through Cartesian spectacles. The problem is that Cartesian assumptions have
become so deeply ingrained in our thinking that it is hard to find the right
non-Cartesian spectacles.
Turning to the other pole of the Cartesian duality, philosophers are familiar
with the privacy of Cartesian consciousness: the fact that the consciousness
of another person is, from the Cartesian point of view, just as inescapably
hidden as the wave function is in the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics
(Bell [22], p.202). What is less widely appreciated is that there is a problem with
ascertaining the contents of one’s own consciousness. A particularly striking
illustration of this point comes from the study of eye movements in reading [23,
24]. In order to explain it I first need to say something about the physiology
of human vision. The region of the retina where the receptors are packed most
tightly, and where visual acuity is consequently highest, is called the fovea. The
part of the visual field which falls on the fovea subtends an angle of ∼ 1◦ at
the centre of the lens. Visual acuity falls off rapidly as one moves away from
this region, which means that in a single fixation of the eyes one is able to
discriminate fine detail in only a very small portion of the visual field (a portion
about the size of a thumbnail held at arm’s length). The reason the visual system
is nonetheless able to acquire accurate information about the whole environment
is that the eyes are continually performing jumps, or saccades. When reading
the duration of a single saccade is typically ∼ 30 ms, while the duration of the
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fixation between saccades is typically ∼ 200 ms (in other activities the saccades
are often bigger, and take correspondingly longer). During a saccade very little
information is transmitted to the cortical processing areas (this phenomenon is
called saccadic suppression, or saccadic masking). It can consequently be said
that most of our visual awareness is based on ∼ 4 snapshots per second, each of
them covering only a small fraction of the visual field. I believe that these facts
are already very counter-intuitive from a Cartesian point of view: it is surprising
(on Cartesian assumptions) that at any moment one sees so little in fine detail,
and suprising also that there are so few jumps per second (a movie which ran
at 4 frames per second would look jumpy). However, it gets worse (worse, I
mean, from a Cartesian point of view). The eye muscles give a brief twitch to
initiate a saccade, and thereafter the eyeballs move ballistically, subject only to
frictional forces. Consequently, a computer attached to an eye-tracking device
can calculate where the next fixation is going to be before the eyes actually
land there. This makes possible the following experiment. One takes a page
of printed text and projects it onto a screen, replacing all the letters by x’s.
The experimental subject sits in front of the screen, and his/her eye-movements
are monitored. During a saccade the computer calculates where the eyes are
going to alight, and puts a handful of letters from the original page just at
that point, leaving x’s everywhere else. In the next saccade the computer wipes
those letters, replacing them by x’s, and puts another group of letters at the
next fixation point. And so on. To illustrate, in one experiment the original
text was
By far the single most abundant substance in the biosphere
is the familiar but unusual inorganic compound called water. In
nearly all its physical properties water is either unique or at
the extreme end of the range of a property. It’s extraordinary
while what appeared on the screen during one particular fixation was
Xx xxx xxx xxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xx xxx xxxxxxxxx
xx xxx xxxxxxxx xxx xxxsual inorganic coxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx. Xx
xxxxxx xxx xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxx xx xxxxxx xxxxxx xx xx
xxx xxxxxxx xxx xx xxx xxxxx xx x xxxxxxxx. Xx’x xxxxxxxxxxxxx
(example taken from Rayner [23]). This, and other, similar techniques have
been used to acquire a wealth information about the visual system. However,
its relevance to the present discussion is simply this. To an observer whose eye
movements are not synchronized with the screen it is obvious (a) that at any
moment the screen contains almost nothing but x’s and (b) that what is on the
screen is constantly changing. However, to the experimental subject, whose eye
movements are synchronized, the screen looks like a perfectly normal page of
text. To convey just how good the illusion is Grimes [25] (also see Dennett [4],
p.361) records that one of the first people to conduct an experiment of this
kind served as the first experimental subject; after a while he sat back from
the apparatus and announced that something must be wrong with the system
because the text was not changing—though it was, in fact, working perfectly.
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I believe that if one reflects on this fact, that it is demonstratively impos-
sible to tell the difference between a normal page of printed text, and a page
which at any given moment consists almost entirely of x’s, then one becomes
genuinely uncertain, as to what precisely are the contents of one’s own con-
sciousness at any given moment. Looking at the page in front of me I can see
that it does not consist almost entirely of x’s. I am able to know this because
information is integrated across saccades. Consequently, I am aware, not only of
the information acquired on this present visual fixation, but also of information
acquired on many previous fixations. But how much information is integrated
across saccades? What precisely is its nature? And precisely how much of that
information is contained in my consciousness? The first two of these questions
are empirical questions which can be, and actually are being investigated by the
usual scientific methods. However, the last is of a different character. At least,
it is of a different character if it is consciousness of the Cartesian sort which is in
question. On Cartesian principles, consciousness is private. It follows that if I
myself cannot tell what exactly are the contents of my own consciousness, then
no amount of neuroscientific experimentation can tell either. That is the case
for my consciousness of the printed text now in front of me. Like the position
of the particle in a two-slit experiment, my consciousness now is indeterminate.
There are numerous other experiments and examples pointing to the same
conclusion. For details the reader may consult refs. [4, 5, 16, 17, 25, 26], and
references cited therein. I will here confine myself to just two other examples.
Grimes [25] used an eye-tracking device coupled to a computer to examine what
happened when a picture (as opposed to a page of printed text) was changed
in the middle of a saccade. In one such experiment, in a picture of two men
wearing differently coloured hats, the hats were switched mid-saccade. 100% of
the experimental subjects did not notice. Even more dramatically, in another
case a parrot, occupying roughly 25% of the picture area, was switched from
brilliant green to brilliant red mid-saccade. In this case most of the subjects did
notice. But 18% of them did not. 25% of the picture area is a lot, and it raises
the question: what exactly is one conscious of, if one does not notice a change as
striking as that? A second illustration is the one given by Dennett [4] (pp.354-
5), of wallpaper in which the pattern consists of a large number of identical
images of Marilyn Monroe. If one looks at it it will only take one a second or
two to realize that the images are all the same. Since the eye performs only a
few saccades per second it is impossible that one has discriminated more than
a handful of the images in sufficient detail to be able to identify it. Instead the
visual system must essentially be making a guess, based on the small number
of cases which it has accurately discriminated. So the question arises again: in
a case like this what exactly are the contents of consciousness?
In ordinary life, and in physics also before the 20th century, the assumption,
that a physical object always has a determinate trajectory, works very well.
But when we push our investigations far enough we start to run into difficulties.
Similarly with the concept of consciousness: when we start to ask the kind of
detailed questions raised in the last few paragraphs we run into problems which
are not entirely dissimilar to the problems which quantum mechanics reveals
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with the other side of the Cartesian polarity.
It is often thought that quantum indeterminacies are weird—humanly un-
imaginable. That is to get it exactly the wrong way round. What is impossible to
imagine is knowing the position of something to infinitely many decimal places.
On other hand, ordinary experience is full of indeterminacies. If someone wants
to know what it would be like to perceive an indeterminate position all they
need do is look at an object in a room, and try to estimate its distance from the
walls. It is unlikely that they can achieve even 10% accuracy. Similarly, to know
what it is like to perceive a number indeterminacy (such as the indeterminacy
of photon number in a coherent state) all one need do is look at a collection of
objects on a table. If one is then asked how many objects there are it is unlikely
one will be able to say, without first taking the time to count them up. The fact
that one cannot answer straight away (and probably could not answer at all if
one did not still have the objects in view) suggests that at the time of asking
one was conscious of the objects, but not of their number.
Dennett has written a book entitled Consciousness Explained [4]. Since
I agree with Dennett on a number of points I ought to stress that I do not
agree with him on this central one. Specifically, I do not think that he, or
anyone else, is close to “explaining consciousness”. Like Pauli, I think that a
satisfactory understanding of these questions will involve breaking out of the
Cartesian mould entirely, and developing a different conceptual framework.
At this stage I should perhaps obviate another potential misunderstanding.
There have been a number of attempts to explain consciousness using quantum
mechanics (see Atmanspacher [27] for a review). Since these approaches all de-
pend on adopting a non-Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, and
since they take the Cartesian concept of consciousness for granted, it should be
apparent, from what I said earlier, that I do not find any of them convincing. If
I keep mentioning consciousness and quantum mechanics in the same breath (so
to speak) it is not because I think that one of them can be used to explain the
other, but because I think that in both cases a clear understanding of the phe-
nomena is obstructed by the same misguided Cartesian philosophy. A second,
subsidiary reason is that I cannot help being struck by parallels3. What the
parallels are worth, I do not know. But I find them interesting. Here is another.
Dennett [4] argues, to my mind persuasively, that in discussions of conscious-
ness it is essential to take careful account of the probe (i.e. the specific question
used to elicit a response at a specific time in a specific experimental context).
Furthermore, if one tries to interpret the results obtained using different probes
in terms of a single, coherent story—a “trajectory of consciousness”—one runs
into difficulties (see, for instance, Dennett’s discussion of the colour phi and cu-
taneous rabbit experiments). Also, the probe disturbs the system: it can bring
into existence a conscious content which otherwise might not have occurred.
This is all reminiscent of the situation in quantum mechanics (there are major
differences, but it is reminiscent).
3For other discussions of this, and related points see refs. [8, 28–32], and references cited
therein.
8
At this stage it will be useful to look at the historical development of Carte-
sian ideas. In the first place this is a good way to see that the Cartesian concept
of consciousness, so far from being a natural intuition (as I believe many people
are still inclined to think), actually depends on postulates which, although they
have since become second-nature for many people, originally had to be worked
out slowly and laboriously. In the second place, it brings out the fact that the
Cartesian philosophy was intimately related to the 17th century development of
modern science.
The Cartesian concept of consciousness is a 17th century invention. It did
not exist before4. In order to appreciate just how original a departure it was, one
needs to see it in the context of the earlier conceptions it replaced. Concerning
classical Graeco-Roman philosophical ideas5 Matson [36] writes
Any teaching assistant can set up the mind-body problem so that
any freshman will be genuinely worried about it. Yet none of the
ancients ever dreamed of it, not even the author of De Anima.
and he goes on to observe that “In the whole classical corpus there exists no
denial of the view that sensing is a bodily process throughout.” Similarly, Cas-
ton [37], discussing the question whether “Aristotle even had a concept of con-
sciousness,” observes that, although “Aristotle clearly distinguishes being awake
and alert from being asleep or knocked out”, he “does not use any single word
to pick out the phenomena we have in mind,” and he “does not share the epis-
temological concerns distinctive of the Cartesian conception of consciousness,
such as privacy or indubitability”. In other words, Aristotle had the everyday
concept of consciousness, but not the Cartesian one.
There were philosophers in the ancient Graeco-Roman world whose thinking
was in some ways similar to the Cartesian philosophy. The one who came closest
was probably St. Augustine. It has been suggested, in fact, that Augustine was
a significant influence on Descartes [33, 38–42], though opinions differ as to
the extent of that influence6. Like other philosophers in the Platonic and neo-
Platonic tradition (and as one might expect of a Christian theologian) Augustine
believed in the existence of an immortal soul. He also thought that one has
indubitable knowledge of one’s own existence:
4Rorty [33] makes this point in some detail. His discussion is very useful. However, Rorty
is not much interested in natural science. In his own words, he tends to “view natural science
as in the business of controlling and predicting things, and as largely useless for philosophical
purposes” (Saatkamp [34], p.32). Consequently he misses a number of points which are crucial
for the present discussion. Burtt [35] is also very relevant.
5In the interests of brevity I will here confine myself to the European, Islamic and Jewish
philosophical traditions, which are closely related, and which are the ones most relevant to
Descartes’ intellectual milieu. For the bearing of Buddhism on the problem of consciousness
see Blackmore [17].
6Descartes himself explicitly denied that he had been influenced (though he welcomed
what he considered to be the few superficial and purely accidental resemblances as providing
useful ammunition in his arguments with Dutch Calvinists) [40]. However, as Wilson [40]
points out, that is not, by itself, conclusive since Descartes was in the habit of downplaying,
and even outright denying his intellectual debts.
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In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of
the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am
deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am
deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived,
how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am
if I am deceived. [Augustine [43], Book XI, Chapter 26]
However, this anticipation of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum should not be allowed
to obscure the differences between Augustine and Descartes, which are consid-
erable. In the first place Augustine, so far from making the indubitability of
one’s own existence central to his philosophy, only mentions it halfway through
the City of God [43] (similarly with the argument as he gives it in Against the
Academics [44] and On the Trinity [45]). There is no suggestion that the only
thing of which one can be really certain is the existence of one’s own conscious-
ness, and that everything else must be deduced from that. On the contrary, he
takes it for granted, as something which does not require demonstration, that in
most cases sense-perceptions convey genuine and reliable information about the
external world (O’Daly [46], p.95). Concerning this point Matthews [41] says
It is, I should say, a singularly important fact about Descartes’s
Meditations that reading them can put one in the grip of what has
come to be called “the problem of the external world.” . . . There is
no similarly desperate ego-isolation in Augustine.
In the second place Augustine’s concept of the soul was completely different
from the Cartesian one. For Augustine the soul is the “the phenomenon of life
in things” (O’Daly [46], p.11). On this conception a bird needs a soul in order to
fly, quite as much a person needs one in order to think. Finally, Augustine had
a different theory of sensation from Descartes. Unlike Descartes, he thought
of sensation as an active process, in which “the soul, as agent of sensation,
activates the force of sentience through a fine corporeal medium” (O’Daly [46],
p.82). Thus in vision he thought that rays burst out of the eye and range
abroad, “so that seeing becomes a kind of visual touching, just as hearing is, so
to speak, aural touching” (ibid). In the Cartesian picture the world is conceived
as a sort of spectacle, and the observer as a member of the audience, whose role
is purely passive. In Augustine’s conception, by contrast, it is as if the audience
climbs onto the stage and walks around among the actors, touching and feeling
them. Given that those are his assumptions I feel that one would not expect
him to think in Cartesian terms, of consciousness as an internal movie show.
Unfortunately the obscurities of the texts are such that it is difficult to be sure
that he does not. Matthews [47] takes the view that
Although commentators have sometimes suggested otherwise, Au-
gustine’s theory of sense perception is not representational, if one
understands by “a representational theory of sense perception” one
according to which an image or sense-datum is the direct object of
perception.
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Kenny [48] thinks that judgment is “most likely” correct (p. 215). Spade [49],
on the other hand, takes a different view. However, it seems to me that the very
fact that there is this scope for disagreement is an indication that Augustine
cannot really have been thinking in Cartesian terms. If someone has genuinely
caught the Cartesian bug they tend to make it very obvious.
It was no different in the medieval period. As one would expect medieval
philosophers had the everyday concept of consciousness. Moreover Augustine
was one of the most widely read philosophers during the medieval period; con-
sequently
It was a commonplace in medieval philosophy that no one can be in
doubt about the existence of one’s own soul. [Yrjo¨nsuuri [50], p.253]
Philosophers were also familiar with Avicenna’s argument, that it is possible
to imagine oneself as a disembodied soul, without sensory experiences (ibid).
However, they did not have any of the other notions which go to make up the
Cartesian concept of consciousness [33, 48, 50–53]. The medieval philosopher
who is most relevant to the present discussion is Aquinas, since he was the most
prominent scholastic philosopher, and consequently the figure most responsible
for determining the view which Descartes opposed. Unlike Augustine, who was
a Platonist, Aquinas was an Aristotelian. Nevertheless they had certain things
in common. In the first place Aquinas, like Augustine considered the soul to
be “whatever makes the difference between animate and inanimate objects”
(Kenny [53], p.129). So as Aquinas saw it a tree, or a beetle has a soul, just as
a person does. Moreover the soul is implicated in every manifestation of life:
in the act of digesting one’s food, or the act of conceiving and bearing a child,
no less than in the act of thinking. In the second place Aquinas, like Augustine
and like just about every other medieval philosopher, was primarily interested in
those aspects of the soul which make people special. It is these which go to make
up the medieval concept of mind. The soul of a beetle is capable of sensation, so
sensation was not considered to be something mental. On the other hand neither
a beetle, nor any other non-human living organism can have abstract thoughts
or take rational decisions (or so medieval philosophers assumed). Consequently
mind, as medieval philosophers conceived it to be, essentially consists of only
two faculties of the soul: intellect and will (see, for example, Kenny [53] p.16).
The medieval concept of soul was thus much broader than the Cartesian one,
while the medieval concept of mind was much narrower (Descartes, by contrast,
identified the concepts of mind and soul). From the fact that this was the way in
which medieval philosophers parcelled up the phenomena, I think it can already
be seen that they were rather unlikely to arrive at anything like the Cartesian
concept of consciousness.
For our purposes there are two important differences between Aquinas and
Augustine. The first is that Aquinas, following Aristotle, considered that the
soul is the form of the body. This might be thought a surprising view for
someone who, as recently as the last century, could fairly be described as the
official philosopher of the Catholic Church [48]. How, one might ask, is it to
be reconciled with a belief in the immortality of the soul? The answer is, only
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with difficulty (see Kenny [53] for a critical discussion). Nevertheless, although
Aquinas thought that the soul, like the smile of the Cheshire cat, could survive
the death of its body, he also thought that what survives is not the person whose
soul it was, and, furthermore, not fully human. As he put it:
. . . but the soul, since it is part of the body of a human being, is not
a whole human being, and my soul is not I; so even if a soul gains
salvation in another life, that is not I or any human being [translated
Kenny [53], p.138]
(it was therefore essential, as Aquinas saw it, that the soul should be re-united
with the body on the day of judgment). It might, perhaps, be said that the
fact that Aquinas thought that the soul is detachable from the body makes him
in some sense a dualist (though I doubt he would have agreed). However, his
dualism (if “dualism” is the right word) is less extreme than that of Descartes
(Descartes would not have said that what survives the death of my body is
“not I”). It could be said that Aquinas’ conception of human nature is earthier
than the Cartesian one. The second important difference is that Aquinas, unlike
Augustine, thought of sensation as a passive process. However, his conception is
no closer than Augustine’s to the Cartesian concept of an interior movie show.
As Kenny puts it:
In Aquinas theory there are no intermediaries like sense-data which
come between perceiver and perceived. In sensation the sense-faculty
does not come into contact with a likeness of the sense-object. In-
stead, it becomes itself like the sense-object, by taking on the sense-
objects form . . . (ibid., p.135)
My aim in giving this brief historical review was to stress the originality of
Descartes’ conception of consciousness. If, in over 2000 years of previous philo-
sophical thinking, no one had come up with anything like it, then it follows that,
whatever else, the idea cannot be regarded as obvious. The question now arises:
what led Descartes to make such a radical break with the philosophical past? It
is often suggested that religion, and a consequent belief in the immortality of the
soul, is a motive for a dualistic conception of human nature. That may be so,
in many cases. However, I do not think it can account for Descartes adopting a
much more radical version of dualism than his medieval predecessors. Aquinas,
like every other major medieval Latin philosopher, was first and foremost a the-
ologian, whereas Descartes’ interests where strongly secular, being centred on
mathematics, physics and physiology. If religion was the explanation then, of
the two, one would expect it to have been Aquinas who had the more ethereal
conception of mind. Yet in fact it was just the other way around.
It is impossible to establish the point conclusively. But I think there are rea-
sons for believing that the real motivation came from Galilean physics. Galileo
was strongly committed to the Pythagorean idea, that the world is fundamen-
tally mathematical in character [35]. As he put it in a famous passage from The
Assayer [54] (p.183)
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Philosophy is written in this all-encompassing book that is con-
stantly open before our eyes, that is the universe; but it cannot
be understood unless one first learns to understand the language
and knows the characters in which it is written. It is written in
mathematical language, and its characters are triangles, circles, and
other geometrical figures; without these it is humanly impossible to
understand a word of it, and one wanders around pointlessly in a
dark labyrinth.
Of course, the universe does not, at first sight, appear to be a book to be written
in the language of mathematics. Galileo consequently needed to account for
all the seemingly non-mathematical, qualitative features of the world, such as
colours, sounds and smells, which do not easily fit in with his mathematizing
programme. For that purpose he adopted a doctrine of the ancient atomists [55],
and denied that they are features of objective reality at all, asserting instead
that they are somehow produced in the “sensitive body”:
Accordingly, I say that as soon as I conceive of a corporeal substance
or material, I feel indeed drawn by the necessity of also conceiving
that it is bounded and has this or that shape; that it is large or
small in relation to other things; that it is in this or that location
and exists at this or that time; that it moves or stands still; that it
touches or does not touch another body; and that it is one, a few, or
many. Nor can I, by any stretch of the imagination, separate it from
these conditions. However, my mind does not feel forced to regard
it as necessarily accompanied by such conditions as the following:
that it is white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or quiet, and pleasantly
or unpleasantly smelling; on the contrary, if we did not have the
assistance of our senses, perhaps the intellect and the imagination
by themselves would never conceive of them. Thus, from the point
of view of the subject in which they seem to inhere, these tastes,
odors, colors, etc., are nothing but empty names; rather they inhere
only in the sensitive body, such that if one removes the animal, then
all these qualities are taken away and annihilated. (ibid, p.185)
I believe that we see in this passage the actual origin of the Cartesian concept
of consciousness. It is true that Galileo himself did not go into details, as to the
nature of the “sensitive body”. But I think that once this step had been taken
the subsequent development, though not inevitable7, became very natural.
It is worth noting that neither Galileo nor Descartes managed to give a
cogent justification for the distinction between primary qualities8, supposed
to be objectively real, and secondary qualities, supposed to be in some sense
illusory. Before the twentieth century the best that could be done was to appeal
to the empirical successes of classical physics, which might have been thought to
7Its lack of inevitability can be seen from, for example, the fact that the ancient atomists
[55] did not develop a concept of consciousness similar to the Cartesian one.
8The terminology “primary” and “secondary” is actually due to Locke [56]
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be based on it. Since the 1920s there has not even been that justification. Quite
the reverse, in fact: the search for primary qualities consistent with quantum
mechanics has been a source of endless difficulties.
I believe that Burtt [35] gets it right when he says that in its first inception
the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities was “buttressed by nothing
more than a mathematical apriorism.”9 (p.311). Rorty (ref. [33], pp. 50-51
and 54-55) asks what sensations, hallucinations, dreams, mathematical truths,
moral rules, the idea of God, moods of depression “and all the rest of what we
now call ‘mental’” have in common. It seems to me that this is like asking what
all the miscellaneous objects one finds on a rubbish dump have in common.
The answer is, of course, that they have nothing in common beyond the fact
that their former owners have no use for them. Similarly with the Cartesian
conception of consciousness: it is a garbage can for all the many things which
mathematical physicists want to be rid of.
Descartes’ complaint about Galileo was that he “digresses continually” and
“does not stop to explain fully any subject” (letter to Mersenne, quoted in
Ariew [57]). To see the kind of thing Descartes might have had in mind consider
Drake’s [58] comments, on Galileo’s failure to give an explicit statement of the
law of inertia:
A modern physicist reading Galileo’s writings would share the puz-
zlement — I might say the frustration — experienced by Ernst Mach
a century ago, when he searched those works in vain for the general
statement that (he felt) ought to be there. It would become evident
to you, as it was to Newton and Mach, that Galileo was in possession
of the law of inertia, but you would not then be able to satisfy those
historians who demand a clear and complete statement, preferably
in print, as a condition of priority.
As Drake goes on to say, it is “ironical” that as a result of this failure on Galileo’s
part the law of inertia “should be credited to Descartes, whose physics on the
whole operated to impede the scientific progress begun by Galileo and continued
by Newton”. I imagine that Descartes would have been equally frustrated by
Galileo’s failure to go into details, regarding events inside the “sensitive body,”
and, more generally, by his failure to give a unified account of the cosmos as
a whole, conceived in mechanistic terms. I suggest that it was Descartes’ aim,
in his early works The World [59] and Treatise on Man [59], to rectify those
deficiencies.
In the mature form of his philosophy, as represented by Meditations on First
Philosophy [60] and Principles of Philosophy [59], Descartes set out his ideas
as a logico-deductive system, starting from the famous proposition cogito ergo
sum. However, an examination of the historical record indicates that this badly
obscures the route by which he was actually led to them. In his early works The
World and Treatise on Man there is no mention of the cogito argument. Instead
9At a later date one could appeal to the empirical successes of the classical theories
apparently based on the doctrine, but not at the time of its first inception.
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these works are entirely devoted to a mechanistic description of the world, con-
ceived along the lines Galileo had previously suggested, and of our relation to it.
Moreover, the treatment is not deductive (as it was in his subsequent writings)
but avowedly hypothetical: he is at pains to stress that he is not saying how
the world definitely is, but only how it conceivably might be. They form part
of a larger project, which occupied him during the years 1630–1633 [61]. The
other parts were either never written, or else have been lost; there is also the
possibility that parts were included in subsequent publications. At all events
the works as we have them now are incomplete. The reason for this is that at
the end of 1633 Descartes learned of Galileo’s condemnation by the Inquisition
and, not wanting “to publish a single word that the Church disapproved of,”
he “preferred to suppress it rather than publish it in a mutilated form” (letter
to Mersenne, quoted in Gaukroger [61], pp.290-1). The works as we have them
now were only published after his death.
In The World Descartes begins by making the same distinction between
primary and secondary qualities that Galileo does in The Assayer. The fact
that he uses one of Galileo’s own examples (the tickling sensation produced by
a feather) suggests that he was well aware of what Galileo had previously written
on the subject. However, he introduces a novelty: namely, the proposition that
the ideas (what would nowadays be called the sense-impressions) of secondary
qualities such as colour have no “resemblance” to qualities actually inherent
in objects themselves. The question naturally arises: does he also maintain
the correlative proposition, that the ideas of primary qualities such as shape
do resemble properties inherent in objects themselves? He writes in such a
way that the unwary reader is likely to assume that he does. Yet, although
it is true that he never (neither in The World nor anywhere else, so far as I
am aware) explicitly denies this second proposition, it is also true that he is
usually careful not to explicitly affirm it. There is one exception to this. In
the Principles of Philosophy he says that “we appear to see clearly” that our
idea of extended matter “comes to us from things located outside ourselves,
which it wholly resembles” (Descartes [59], p.223): which, although it is not
quite the same as to say that the idea of shape resembles something in the
object itself, seems rather close. Of course, it is easy to see that Descartes is
on the horns of a dilemma here. On the one hand he thinks that the mind,
and ideas in the mind are unextended (i.e. clean outside the physical universe);
and it is hard to see how something fundamentally non-spatial can “wholly
resemble” something that fundamentally is spatial10. On the other hand, if he
were to say that the ideas of properties like shape do not resemble anything
in the outside world, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities
would evaporate. The question, as to what exactly Descartes did think, as to
the relationship between sensations and the objects around us, is vexed, and
10Something non-spatial might conceivably correspond to something spatial (c.f.
Descartes [59], p.218). But “correspond” is too weak for Descartes’ purposes. Colour sensa-
tions correspond to properties in objects, on his theory. He needs a much stronger relation
than mere correspondence to substantiate the primary-secondary distinction. But what could
that relation possibly be?
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it has given rise to a substantial literature11 (see refs. [61–66], and references
cited therein). But these exegetical considerations are, in a way, irrelevant.
Irrespective of Descartes own views, I think it is fair to say that, on a popular
level, one of the actual effects of his writings was to encourage the notion that, by
the simple operation of subtracting all the secondary qualities in our imaginative
depictions, we can arrive at a perfectly faithful picture of things as they really
are. This idea, that the aim of physics is to supply us with the one true picture
of things, was extremely influential in the past. Moreover, although those who
accept the Copenhagen interpretation have abandoned the idea, I am not sure
that the same is true of all the anti-Copenhagenists. At all events, I think it
must be fair to say that the anti-Copenhagenists remain wedded to the related,
and, as it seems to me, equally dubious idea, that the goal of physics is to
provide us with the one true description of things (or, at least, the vocabulary
and syntax of that description). Also, the notion continues to be widespread,
that when one looks at a rose the shape one sees is in some sense12 real, while
the colour is only a quale in the head.
In Treatise on Man Descartes turns to a description of the human body
conceived as a mechanism, with particular emphasis on the brain. He ends
with a promise to give a description of the “rational soul”. Unfortunately this
description is one of the parts of the manuscript which was either never written,
or else has been lost. However, since everything he says about the brain is
conformable with later accounts (down to and including the special status of
the pineal gland), I think it is fair to assume that he intended to give an account
of the soul which was similarly conformable. Specifically, I think it may be
assumed that he intended to say that the soul is a separate, immaterial entity
interacting with the brain via the pineal gland. Moreover, I think it is easy to
see why he would have said that. I do not say it was inevitable that he would
take such a view. Indeed, his contemporary Thomas Hobbes, in the Third Set
of Objections (published jointly with the Meditations), argued for a completely
materialistic conception of human nature [60]. However, it does seem to me that,
given his opinions about primary and secondary qualities, it was very natural
for Descartes to take such a view. It would be inconsistent with his Pythagorean
principles13 to suppose that, located here and there in the otherwise colourless
expanse of mathematical mechanism, there are little brightly painted islands. It
would be equally inconsistent to suppose that, dotted around in the mechanism,
there are little islands somehow endowed with subjective colour experiences.
Since he could not locate colour perceptions inside the physical universe, what
else could he do but locate them outside?
11It does seem to me that a person whose writings cannot be understood without the
assistance of an army of exegetes has failed to express himself clearly. I also feel that, in such
a case, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the unclarity in the words reflects a corresponding
unclarity in the underlying thoughts.
12But what sense precisely?
13Hobbes was not a mathematician, and is unlikely to have shared Descartes’ Pythagorean
feelings. Perhaps that is the reason he could accept the move to full materialism. Perhaps it
is also the reason the ancient Atomists (who were not Pythagoreans either) were not led to
the Cartesian concept of consciousness.
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Descartes ceased working on the manuscript eventually published as The
World and Treatise on Man at the end of 1633. According to Gaukroger the
first hard evidence14 of him taking an interest in scepticism comes a year later
in an account by Samuel Hartlib, who describes him “complaining of the un-
certainties of all things” in the winter of 1634/5 (Gaukroger [61], p.304). The
first published version of the cogito argument appeared in the Discourse on the
Method [59], in June 1637. This argument is another of Descartes’ strikingly
original departures from previous philosophical thinking. As I mentioned earlier,
it was a medieval commonplace, due originally to Augustine, that one cannot
doubt the existence of one’s own soul [50]. Moreover there was a widespread
interest in sceptical arguments during the early Modern period [67]. However,
there was no precedent for the way in which Descartes put these ingredients
together.
The cogito argument begins with what is sometimes called an act of hy-
perbolic doubt. It is worth asking what motivated this step. As Wittgenstein
has stressed one needs reasons to doubt [68]. One also needs a suitable con-
text. At least, one does if one wants people to listen. Suppose someone ex-
pressed doubt, as to whether their head contained sawdust instead of brains
(Wittgenstein [68], p.36e). This would be a much more modest doubt than
the global, all-encompassing act of scepticism with which Descartes begins the
cogito argument. Yet no one would take it seriously. While people have taken
the Cartesian doubt very seriously indeed: it is fair to say that the problem
of the external world, and the various philosophical movements to which it
has given rise (empiricism, subjective idealism, Kantianism, objective idealism,
positivism, pragmatism, phenomenology, . . . ) has been the dominant theme in
Western philosophy for the last 350 years. Why is that? I think the answer is
that, although in the context of everyday life it would be crazy to doubt the ex-
istence of external reality, in the context of the views expressed in The Assayer,
The World and Treatise on Man the doubt becomes very reasonable. If one has
become convinced that, in sober truth, our senses are radically misleading us
as to the existence of colours, sounds, tastes etc, then it is surely very natural
to wonder if they might also be misleading us as to the existence of shapes,
sizes, positions etc. And if one has got as far as wondering if the senses are to
be trusted at all, then how does one avoid doubting the existence of external
reality? Moreover, I would suggest that that reason for doubting was operative,
not only in the mind of Descartes, but also in the minds of his philosophical
successors. It was operative precisely because it was widely believed that sci-
ence had shown that our senses are radically misleading us. Scientists who are
scornful of philosophical worries about the existence of the external world miss
the point: it was science itself (or what people thought of as science) which
originally motivated the worries [35].
In short, I would suggest that all the distinctive features of the Cartesian
14Popkin, however, notes that an autobiographical passage in Discourse on the Method
suggests that the line of thought which led to the cogito argument started earlier, in 1628 or
1629 (Popkin [67], p.147; Descartes [59], p.126)
17
philosophy are consequences1516 of Galileo’s original Pythagorean hypothesis,
that the world is fundamentally mathematical in character, and of the related
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. In particular, this whole
way of thinking is rooted in the Galilean-Cartesian concept of matter. Cartesian
consciousness is a secondary concept, parasitic on that.
There is an irony in this story. In the 17th century there was no possibility
of finding solid empirical support for the micro-mechanical explanations of such
phenomena as colour, or heat, on which the Galilean-Cartesian philosophy was
based. These explanations remained highly speculative until the 19th century
when hard evidence started to accumulate. Even then progress was slow, as can
be seen from the fact that in the late 19th century controversy about atomism
the two sides were equally matched [69–72]. A nice illustration of this is the
fact that in the 1890’s Planck, who was subsequently to inaugurate an atom-
istic view of electromagnetic radiation, was sceptical about atoms, to the extent
that Boltzmann could attribute to him the opinion that work on kinetic theory
was a “waste of time and effort” (Kuhn [70], pp.22-3; also see Krips [71]). It
was only in the 20th century that the validity of micro-mechanical explanations
of the behaviour of matter was established to the satisfaction of every com-
petent physicist. The irony is that the same advances which finally vindicated
micro-mechanical explanations also cast serious doubt on Galilean-Cartesian as-
sumptions about what such explanations ought to be like. Indeed, one of the key
papers leading to the general acceptance of atomism (Einstein’s 1905 Brownian
motion paper [73]) was published in the same year, by the same person, as one
of the key papers casting doubt on Galilean-Cartesian assumptions (Einstein’s
1905 photoelectric paper [74]).
Quantum mechanics challenges the whole Galilean-Cartesian framework. It
is a challenge which has yet to call forth an adequate response. The Copenhagen
Interpretation provides a way of thinking about quantum experiments which is
sufficient for the practical needs of working physicists. But, as its critics point
out, it hardly amounts to a coherent philosophy of nature. Yet, instead of
taking the hint from experiment, and trying to move forward, the response of
those critics has mostly been to fall back on old, 17th century modes of thought,
and to try to find ways of interpreting quantum phenomena which would be
consistent with Cartesian assumptions. Over half a century ago Pauli described
such attempts as “regressive” (see, for instance, the letter to Fierz quoted in
Gieser [1], p.266), and it seems to me that everything which has happened since
tends to confirm that judgment. What we need to do is to dig up the Galilean-
Cartesian foundations and replace them with a different conceptual structure,
better adjusted to all we have learned since the year 1900.
The Cartesian philosophy is built on two key principles: (1) the Pythagorean
hypothesis, that there is one true, complete description of the world, express-
ible in mathematical language and (2) the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities. I believe we ought to abandon both those principles.
15Not consequences in a rigorous, deductive logical sense, but in a looser, psychological
sense.
16This is close to Burtt’s [35] conclusion.
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The idea, naturally suggested by quantum mechanics, that we should dis-
pense with the Pythagorean hypothesis, produces in many people a sense of
vertigo. They fear that letting go of this is tantamount to letting go of the con-
cept of physical reality. But that merely shows that they are so fixated on the
Galilean-Cartesian way of thinking about physical reality that they are unable
to envisage an alternative.
A description is something human. The ability to give descriptions evolved
(presumably) in the palaeolithic, for the purpose of communicating such facts
as the location of the nearest source of flint-nodules. We have a come a long
way since then, cognitively speaking. Nevertheless, the fact is that our mod-
ern mathematical descriptions of nature are all expressible in the language of
axiomatic set theory, which is a formalization of the naive set theoretic ideas
that palaeolithic hunter-gatherers (presumably) used when sorting their stone
tools, negotiating their intricate family relationships, etc etc. Moreover, our
mathematical descriptions comprise sequences of propositions, just like the ver-
bal communications of palaeolithic hunter-gatherers. In short, our mathemat-
ical descriptions bear a clear human imprint. Conceivably the universe splits
logically, into a collection of sentence-sized morsels, each perfectly adapted to
human cognitive capacities17. But I see no a priori reason for assuming that to
be the case.
I believe our attitude to this question should be empirical. If Einstein had
achieved the same stunning success, with his attempt to explain quantum me-
chanics in terms of classical field theory, that he did with general relativity,
then there would be reason to take the Pythagorean hypothesis seriously. But
since he did not, and since no one else has either, I think there are grounds for
scepticism. This is not to say that I question the validity of the partial descrip-
tions we are able to give. Nor is to say that I am an anti-realist. It is not even
(necessarily) to deny that God is a mathematician. It is only to say that God
is, perhaps, a little more subtle and (dare I say?) interesting than Galileo gave
him credit for being.
Turning to the primary-secondary distinction, it is obvious that colour per-
ceptions are in some sense subjective. The question is, however, whether they
are any more subjective than, for example, the statement that the E vector
at position r is 3i − 4j + 7k Vm−1—where by “statement” I mean the actual
ink marks, or the brain states which occur as one reads them. It is true that
a colour-blind person will fail to discriminate two colours which a normally
sighted person sees to be different: from which it would seem to follow that the
colour-blind person has a different visual experience from the normally sighted
person. But then it is equally true that a person who measures the electric field
intensity to an accuracy of ±1 Vm−1 will have a different cognitive experience
from a person who uses a different instrument to measure it to an accuracy of
±0.1 Vm−1.
Colour perceptions, being perceptions, are subjective by definition (in a
17There is some overlap here with the discussion in Chapter 1 of Rorty [75]. However, the
fact that I agree with Rorty, that the universe is not a book, should not be taken to imply
that I agree with everything else he says in this chapter.
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sense). But then, so are quantitative thoughts. Idealists aside, few people are
tempted to suppose that, because the belief, that carbon has proton number
6, is only a belief, therefore carbon does not really have proton number 6. No
more should one be tempted to suppose that, because the perception of green
is only a perception, therefore grass is not really green.
The function of eyes is to acquire information. Looking at an object is not
the same as listening to a verbal description of that object. But what one ac-
quires by looking is still information, and to that extent it may be regarded as
a kind of statement18. Cartesian-minded classical physicists, like Einstein, sup-
posed that the world is completely describable, in terms of fields (or whatever).
Allowing that to be the case, for the sake of argument, it would not follow that
the statements of one’s visual system are any more subjective than statements
made in the approved mathematical language. What the classical physicist’s
description says in one way, using the language of fields, the visual system says
in another way, using the language of colours. To be sure visual statements say
less—contain less information—than the classical physics description (supposing
that to be valid). But that does not make them subjective. If one takes some
data given to 10 significant figures, and rounds everything off to 3 significant
figures, one loses a lot of information. But the information which remains is no
less objective than it was before. Worrying about the difference between the
mathematical description and the description in terms of colours is like worrying
about the difference between a description in English and the same description
written out in French. Colour qualities are no more in the head—and no less in
the head—than the electromagnetic field is in the head.
Discussions of qualia are often vitiated by the idea that there are two pictures
involved: one that is coloured (the picture we get from our eyes) and one that
is not (the picture we get from physics). This idea goes back to Descartes, of
course, with his talk of colours not “resembling” anything in the object. It is
based on a confusion, since neither of these pictures exists. There is no picture
in the head, as we have seen. Moreover the mathematical descriptions which
physics gives us are not pictures either19—any more than a verbal description
is a picture. Thinking that colours do not exist in reality because there are no
colours in the mathematical description is like thinking that a city is colourless
because the verbal description in the guidebook is printed in black and white.
Back in the Palaeolithic, when language first developed, abstract, symbolic
descriptions conveyed much less information than the descriptions we get from
our eyes. It was therefore natural to take the visual description to be the stan-
dard, or canonical description, against which verbal descriptions were to be
judged. Effectively, reality was identified with the visual description (supple-
mented with information obtained from the other senses). However, with the
development of mathematical physics in the 17th century we found an abstract,
symbolic mode of description which, unlike ordinary language, was actually su-
18Descartes makes an analogy between words and colours at the beginning of The World.
However, he fails to draw what I believe to be the correct conclusion
19It is impossible to imagine the number 3, in the abstract. Similarly, it is impossible to
imagine quantities like vectors. The electric field vector, for example.
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perior to the visual description in terms of informational capacity. It therefore
became natural to take the new mathematical description to be the canonical
description: in effect, to identify reality with the mathematical description. It
seems to me that the lesson of quantum mechanics is that we should drop the
whole idea of there being a canonical description. Galileo’s book metaphor is
profoundly misleading. There is no mathematical description in the sky. The
only descriptions around are the ones we humanly construct and which, being
human, are necessarily partial.
To say that there is no canonical description with which reality can be iden-
tified is not to deny the existence of reality. Supposing there to be a canonical
description, we have never known it. Such knowledge of reality as we possess
right now is entirely expressed in terms of our ordinary, humanly constructed
descriptions. It is not scepticism to suggest that knowledge so expressed is all
we ever will possess.
In this paper I have essentially confined myself to a criticism of Cartesian
philosophy. To construct an adequate non-Cartesian philosophy would take an
enormous amount of work. However, I believe there is reason to think that if we
were to undertake that project it would lead to a conceptual revolution equal
in magnitude to the 17th century Cartesian one. In particular, it would lead to
conceptions of the world, and of human nature, which differed as much from the
Cartesian conceptions as the latter did from medieval conceptions. So much so
that we would, perhaps, no longer want to use the words “consciousness” and
“matter” (except in their everyday senses, of course).
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